This article analyzes the effects of trade liberalization between two asymmetric industries. Asymmetries concern consuemers' masses and labor endowments. The latter, together with human capital specificity in the production of the variants of a vertically differentiated good, determine market form and the range of products available in each industry. We show that market integration benefits or harms the agents in the industries following on industry-specific parameters. As the conditions on gains and losses from trade are independent between countries, bilateral losses from trade can emerge at equilibrium.
Introduction
On the last decades the process of integration has, become a key feature of the world's economic environment; the volume of internationally traded goods and services has been constantly increasing over the years. See, for example, data provided by the World Trade Organization (2002).
More specifically, empirical evidences shows the growing importance of vertical intra industry trade (IIT) in exchange relations among countries. Fontagné et al. (1997) show that in the period 1980-1994 the share of vertical IIT within the European Union's countries has increased noticeably with respect to the * I wish to thank professors J. Gabszewicz, P.Garella, X. Wauthy for their very helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to professor E. Maskin for very a interesting discussion on this paper. Of course all remaining errors are mine.
† Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Bologna-Italy and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve Belgium. Email: bacchieg@spbo.unibo.it share of horizontal intra industry trade. Other papers, such as Aturupane et al. (1997) , Clark and Stanley (1999) show that of vertical IIT applies to trade between developed and less developed countries as well 1 .
Industrial Organization has proposed many contributions that study trade flows by means of oligopoly models. In particular, several articles tackle the problem of determining magnitude and sign of gains from trade at aggregate as well as at the single agents' level; among these, see, for example, Markusen Factor endowments play a crucial role in determining the flow directions in vertical IIT. Courakis (1991) , Webster (1996) , Oulton (1996) Mason et al.
(1996), Greenaway and Torstensson (1997) , Martìn-Montaner and Orts (2002) relate the quality level of a country's exports to its factors endowments, and in particular to the skill level of its work force. Intuitively the production of higher-quality goods requires the use of higher-skilled, sector-specific labor units. Stated differently, there exists a quality transfer from production factors to products.
Gabszewicz and Turrini ((1999) and (2000)), Turrini (2000) develop this intuition formally within oligopoly models. The contribution of highly-skilled work force -the only input-is necessary to the production of the higher variants of a vertically differentiated good. Hence both the availability of skilled workers and the labor market structure have a direct influence on the final goods' market equilibrium. These articles, however, assume a competitive wage setting for the skilled work force. This specific modeling choice contrasts with the intrinsic non-competitive nature of markets for sophisticated production factors. Indeed, when skills are specific, skilled workers (the only owners of the necessary human capital) are conscious of the monopoly power they exert in the production of the higher variants of the goods. Symmetrically, those firms hire skilled workers are likely to be aware of their monopsony power towards the work force. In this paper we wish to address this particular issue. To this end, we further develop a simple model -Bacchiega (2002)-in which, following Brander and Spencer (1988) we justified and applied a cooperative mechanism, namely the Nash Bargaining Solution, to the skilled workers' wage setting. This allowed us to study the welfare effects of variations in the relative bargaining power in the skilled labor's market. More precisely we extend the framework proposed in Bacchiega (2002) to vertical IIT. Many studies deal with the effects of trade liberalization on the products markets when factor (and in particular labor) markets are not competitive (see, e.g. Huzinga (1993) , Sørensen (1993), Naylor (1998)), but, as far as we know, they do not simultaneously include into the analysis skillspecificity (and its implications) and vertical product differentiation, two key features of intra-industrial trade.
More in detail, we analyze the effects of trade liberalization between two asymmetric industries that, after a period of autarchy, are allowed to freely trade.
Our analysis rests on two key assumptions:
(i) Higher variants of a vertically differentiated good cannot be produced without the use of high-skill, product-specific labor. Therefore, industries that are not endowed with this kind of input are limited in the quality range they can supply to consumers.
(ii) Wage for the skilled workers is set through a Nash bargaining process between them and the firm(s) that decides to employ this input.
The specificity of human capital requires a modeling technique for the skilled workers' wage that incorporates the monopoly-monopsony relations in the market for skilled labor. Although labor economics literature in general does not deal with vertical differentiation issues, the choice to model the interaction between the set of skilled workers and the firms that hire them through the Nash 
The Model
For sake of clarity we will discuss separately the modeling choices for Home and for Foreign, even if they overlap in many aspects. Finally we sketch the time structure of the game.
Home Consumers
Consumers's utility is defined over variants of a vertically differentiated good.
Denote θ the parameter measuring the intensity of preferences for quality of consumer θ. We assume that this parameter is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,θ]. Consumer's mass is normalized to 1.
A consumer can buy either one unit of the good or nothing. We assume that his preferences are modeled à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) . Hence, the utility of consumer θ is:
where p i is the price of quality variant i. The parameter U 0 is high enough to always guarantee market coverage (i.e. all consumers buy one unit of the good).
Suppose that two qualities only of the good are available for consumption: a high-quality variant (h) and a low-quality one (l). A standard approach allows to write down market demands: let θ h,l be the marginal consumer (e.g. the consumer that is indifferent between purchasing one unit of variant h and one unit of variant l at their market prices). It is easy to verify that
Market demand for the high-quality variant writes, then:
and, since market is covered, demand for the low-quality one:
Firms
Two (ex-ante symmetric) profit-maximizing firms are active in Home 3 ; they first choose the quality level of the good they will produce and compete on the final goods market in prices. Anticipating a Bertrand equilibrium argument we can exclude the case in which they both specialize in the production of the same good 4 . We will henceforth label firms with the index related to the variant they produce. Firms' technologies are characterized by constant-returnsto-scale. Labor is the only input. One unit of labor produces one unit of the good, irrespectively of its quality. More specifically, unskilled labor produces the low-quality variant of the good only, while skilled one can be used in the production of both the high-and the low-quality variants. Market demands for the differentiated commodity hence represent firms' labor demands as well.
These assumptions allow us to write firms' profits as:
Where r is the (exogenous) remuneration of skilled labor and w is the wage paid to skilled workers when employed in the production of the high-quality variant.
Work force
In Home two types of workers are present: skilled and unskilled. They are all endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically. Unskilled workers are arbitrarily many and wage takers.
Skilled workers can be employed indifferently in the production of the highor the low-quality good. In the first case they fully exploit their skills, and receive a wage w that is determined through a bargaining process between a union and each single firm that decides to employ skilled labor. In the latter case their productivity equals the unskilled workers' one, consistently they are paid the exogenous unskilled workers' wage r. We assume that all the skilled workers (and them only) belong to the union, therefore there exists a unique w exclusively determined by the bargaining process. We use the Nash Bargaining solution to determine the outcome of the bargaining between the union and the The union is interested in maximizing the skilled workers' expected wage. This is obtained as the combination of the wages w and r with weights equal to a union member's probability of being hired as skilled (and conversely as unskilled) given market demands and the number of members of the union (equal to the number of skilled workers). Denoting this last variable N 5 , the skilled workers' expected wage writes:
where
is the probability of being hired in the production of the high-quality variant.
Foreign
The superscript F stands for Foreign.
Consumers
Foreign is a replica of Home from the preferences viewpoint. In particular the support of the appreciation-for-quality parameter θ and the quality level u i consumers attribute to variant i (i ∈ {h, l}) are the same. So utility for Foreign consumers writes:
is M . Again, the marginal consumer approach identifies market demands.
Firms
In order to keep the analysis simple we assume that a competitive fringe of producers is installed in Foreign, each one of them is endowed with a constantreturns-to-scale technology: One unit of labor produces one unit of good.
Work force
Foreign is not endowed with skilled workers. On the contrary unskilled labor is abundant, and workers are wage-takers. The quality level of the only good they can produce -namely the low-quality one-is u l , exactly the same as in Home. We hence assume that their remuneration is equal to r 6 . 6 A series of remarks:
1) The many similarities between Home and Foreign, in addition to keeping calculations manageable, allow to keep the focus of the analysis on the consequences of factor endowment and size asymmetries, the purpose of this study.
2) The absence of skilled workers in Foreign prevents this industry from having a domestic production of the high-quality variant of the good. However consumers' preferences are defined on it as well.
3) Competitive market form could be dropped assuming oligopolistic firms playing a price game on the only good they can produce: a classical Bertrand argument would lead price to marginal cost and profits down to zero, so (autarchic) oligopoly equilibrium would correspond to competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we assume that workers, consumers and firms are immobile, goods only can flow between countries.
Time structure
We structure the model around three periods. Label them τ = 0, 1, 2. We ignore discounting between periods.
Period τ = 0 concerns Home only: firms in that country make their (irreversible) decisions on the quality they specialize in. Their decisions are taken evaluating the flow of profits they will receive in the following periods, and agents perfectly foresee the pace of trade liberalization.
Period τ = 1 is played in autarchy: no trade is allowed between Home and Foreign. In Foreign, the production of the low-quality variant of the good takes place. In Home a two-stage subgame (as in Bacchiega (2002)) is played: in the first stage the firm that has decided to produce the high-quality variant of the good bargains with the union over the skilled workers wage, in the second firms compete à la Bertrand in the vertically differentiated domestic market.
At the beginning of period τ = 2 trade is liberalized at zero transportation costs. In Foreign again no game takes place: producers continue to supply the market with the low quality good sold at its marginal cost. In Home, on the contrary, firms and union are free to set again the skilled workers' wage and market prices following market liberalization. A two-stage game as the one played in period τ = 1 takes place.
Equilibrium analysis
We look for subgame perfect Nash Equilibria of the three-period game. As trade liberalization is exogenous, equilibria in periods 1 and 2 are independent, so we describe the former first.
Autarchy (τ = 1)
Home Equilibrium analysis for Home industry parallels the one developed in Bacchiega (2002), and which we refer to for a detailed description. We shall recall the procedure followed to describe equilibrium, presenting the main results (interested readers may see Bacchiega (2002) ).
Subgame-prefect Nash equilibria in period 1 are found solving backwards the two stages of the game. The solution to:
( ∂π h (.)
is the price-subgame equilibrium. Plugging these values in the definition of demands, profits and expected wage (eqs. (2)- (6), allows us to write them as a function of the skilled workers' wage w.
The next step is then to solve the bargaining game and find the equilibrium value for w through the Nash bargaining solution.
In order to apply this concept, the definitions of agents' utility functions and outside options (the maximum each agent can guarantee himself in case of failure in reaching the agreement) are required.
The choice of utilities is straightforward: profits for firm h and expected wage for the union. Outside options reflect the basic features of our model. As for the firm that has decided to produce the high-quality variant it is zero: if it fails to reach the agreement with the union it cannot employ skilled workers, so given our technological assumptions, it cannot produce the high-quality good.
In this case it can either employ unskilled workers and produce the low-quality good; but this will generate a Bertrand on a homogeneous good with the other firm, otherwise it can exit the market. In both cases its profits are zero. The outside option for the union is the unskilled workers wage r. If no agreement is reached, no skilled worker can be employed in the production of the highquality good. In this case we assume that all the members of the union find (inside or outside the industry under analysis) an alternative job. But as their human capital is specific they perform not better than unskilled workers, and consequently receive the same wage r.
Accordingly, we write the (weighted) Nash product as:
where µ (res. 1 − µ) represents the weight attributed to the high-quality firm (res. union) in the bargaining process. Maximization of (7) with respect to w leads as unique solution:
Prices, demands, profits and expected wage can be written as function of the model's parameters. Equilibrium prices, profits and expected wage are given by the following expressions:
and
We again refer to Bacchiega (2002) for detailed comments on these results.
Foreign
Equilibrium analysis for Foreign before market integration is straightforward.
The lack of skilled workers in that industry prevents the production of the high-quality variant of the good. Still the production of the low-quality is possible. The competitive fringe of producers sells the low-quality variant of the good at it marginal cost, so that p F * l = r, earning zero profits. Notice that at this price market is covered in Foreign: support and distribution of preferences in F is the same as in H and we assumed that home market was covered at
Trade (τ = 2)
At the beginning of the second period trade is opened at zero transportation costs between Home and Foreign 7 . The interplay of two forces determines the new equilibrium configuration. The first -acting through the increase in the 7 As markets are integrated we perform a unique analysis for H and F .
mass of consumers in the integrated industry-is the market expansion effect.
The second -due to changes in equilibrium prices-is the competitive effect.
On one side, both the oligopolists in Home and the competitive fringe in
Foreign face a new market whose consumers' mass is given by 1 + M , strictly greater than the autarchic ones (market expansion effect).
The competitive effect calls for a more detailed analysis. Consider low-quality producers first. The quality level of the low-quality variants produced in Home and in Foreign is the same; hence after market integration each consumer who is willing to purchase this variant will address to the firm that sells it at the lowest price. As market structure does not change in F , the price charged by F -fringe on both markets will be the marginal cost of production r. Home's lowquality producer must match this price r and makes zero profits. In this case the share of the total demand that H's oligopolist and F 's fringe serve is a priori undetermined. To perform calculations on the effects of trade liberalization, we assume a "home-bias effect": consumers towards choose local production when prices are the identical.
As far as the high-quality producer is concerned, the direct competition of low-price foreigner fringe directly reduces the demand for the good it produces and -because of his strategic reaction to the fall its rivals' prices-the price it can charge on each unit sold too.
Consider the union that represent skilled workers. It benefits from the market expansion effect, as Foreign's demand for the high-quality variant will translate in a higher demand for skilled labor. The competitive effect, which acts through the low-quality good, on the contrary, leads to a reduction of the firm's gross profits, which represent the total amount of revenue to be shared between the firm and the union itself.
We now move to the description of the trade equilibrium configuration. A hat (ˆ) over the variables identifies trade period (τ = 2). Again, in order to find a subgame-perfect equilibrium we tackle the market game first, moving then to the bargaining game. Incidentally notice that, as H's low-quality producer has been "trapped" by the competitive F 's competitive fringe, the only optimization is performed by the h-firm 8 .
From the previous paragraphs we know thatp * l =p F * l = r. Demands for the high-and low-quality in H write:
while in F :
wherep F h is the price charged by the high-quality producer on foreigner market. Profits to the H-firm arê
The h-firm maximizes (8) with respect top h andp F h jointly. Equilibrium prices are therefore:
Since only consumers' masses in Home and Foreign differ, the optimal prices are the same in Home and Foreign.
In order to solve the bargaining stage of period τ = 2 we plug the equilibrium values for prices into the definitions of demands and profits.
We now define the probability of being hired in the production of the highquality variant in the integrated industry as:
We assume that N > maxŵ[D h (ŵ) +D F h (ŵ)] in order to have a meaningful probability measure 9 . A skilled worker's expected wage after trade liberalization is then:
The interpretation of (9) parallels the one of (6): the union can guarantee to a fractionρ h (ŵ) of its members a job in the production of the high-quality and Perloff (1994). 9 At equilibrium this condition writes N > 1 + M. This is the condition which we referred to in a note in page 6. variant of the good and to the complementary fraction the unskilled workers' remuneration r. The market expansion effect adds to the Home demand for the h-version the demand stemming out from Foreign consumers.
With respect to the analysis developed for autarchy, the definitions of the agents' utilities and outside options do not change: if the agreement is not reached, the firm either exits the market or produces the low-quality good, earning in both cases zero profits. From the union's point of view, an agreement failure implies that all its members will receive the unskilled workers wage.
Hence the Nash product is:
where µ ∈ [0, 1] (res. 1 − µ) is still the weight attributed to the union (res.
to the firm) in the bargaining process. Solution to the problem
determines the bargained wage.
Lemma 1 The skilled workers wage under trade iŝ
Proof. Consider first the case µ ∈]0, 1[. Taking logs of (10) and using first order conditions 10 gives as unique solution:
Then notice that when µ = 0 (10) reduces toB 0 (ŵ) =Π h (ŵ), which always decreases inŵ. The solution to the maximization problem is thenŵ
Finally, consider the case µ = 1. (10) writesB 00 (ŵ) = E(ŵ) − r. The maximum ofB 00 (ŵ) is obtained forŵ
Pluggingŵ(.) into prices, demands profits and expected wage allows to write them as a function of the model's parameters only. We present them in the following 10 Second order conditions are always satisfied.
Lemma 2
The values for equilibrium prices, profits and expected wage write:
These preceding values will be useful in the section devoted to the study of the effects of trade liberalization.
The last step in order to conclude equilibrium analysis is to solve the game played by Home firms at τ = 0.
Quality choice (τ = 0)
Label the two (symmetric) firms in Home before they make their product choice Firm 1 and Firm 2. Their strategy set is given by q k = {h, l}, where k ∈ {1, 2}
and h (res. l) stands for the choice to specialize in the production of the high (res. low) quality variant of the good. We can write a payoff matrix
Nash equilibria in pure strategies are (h, l) and (l, h). The choice to specialize in the same variant of the good leads to a Bertrand war between symmetric firms on a homogeneous product, and hence zero profits. As firms are symmetric, no matter which equilibrium branch is taken at τ = 0: the structure of the subsequent game remains the same as the one described in the previous paragraphs.
The effects of trade liberalization
In this section we finally discuss the effects of trade liberalization and hence the attitudes agents have towards it. We will firstly tackle the problem from the single agents (firms and union) in Home -remember that Foreign agents are all price takers-and then we will use welfare measures to perform the same analysis from a Government/Social Planner point of view, both for Home and Foreign.
Consider Home firms first. After trade liberalization, the low-quality producer's profits fall down from a (strictly) positive value, namely π * l (.) to zero, while the high-quality producer's ones move from π * h (.) toΠ * h (.). A direct comparison between these four values leads to the following Proposition 1 Home's low-quality producer always loses from trade liberalization, while the high-quality producer gains from trade liberalization if
The competitive effect lowers the price (through the strategic response of 
The competitive and market expansion effects' interplay determines the sign and magnitude of gains from trade for skilled workers. The latter increases the probability of being hired as skilled at equilibrium, the former's double effect on one side reduces this probability and on the other lowers the price to be paid for each unit of the h-quality good.
The bargained skilled worker's wage w, and hence skill premium -e.g. the difference between the skilled-unskilled workers remuneration-always decreases In τ = 1 Home' welfare at equilibrium is:
while in Foreign:
Denotingθ h,l andθ F h,l the marginal consumers respectively in Home and Foreign in τ = 2 trade equilibrium welfare in Home writes
where the last term represents the sum of profits and wages earned by Home agents on foreigner market, which add to the welfare generated by production and consumption on the domestic market.
Similarly, welfare of Foreign when trade is opened is:
11 Notice that the assumption of home bias effect we made allows us to attribute local production of the l-variant to the local welfare measure.
When trade is opened F consumers benefit form the increase in the variety of products they are offered, but a part of the consumers that under autarchy consumed the locally product low-quality variant of the good now address to the h-quality producer in Home. The gross profits derived by this demand flow to Home's instead of accruing to Foreign's welfare.
Direct comparisons allow to write
Lemma 3 The welfare of Home's industry increases with trade liberalization if
First of all notice that consumers in Home always benefit from trade liberalization as the prices they pay for both variants are lower:p * there should exists an empirically testable negative relation between these two variables.
Proposition 3
The threshold values of M that determine the attitudes of agents towards trade liberalization can be univocally ranked in the following way Consider Foreign.
Lemma 4
The welfare of Foreign's industry increases with trade liberalization
Foreign does not export to Home, so it is not affected by market expansion effect; neither its producers lose from trade, as they were earning zero profits in autarchy. But trade liberalization makes a part of the consumers shift in consumption from the locally-made l-quality variant to the imported h-quality variant. in this shift their utility increases. Foreign industry's wage mass (the individual wage times the number of workers employed in industry) on the contrary decreases. If the unskilled workers' wage is "low enough" (r ≤ r F ) the loss in terms of wage mass is more than compensated by the gain in terms of consumer's surplus, so the welfare of the industry increases 12 . Notice that r F inversely depends on the µ: the more powerful is the union in Home the lower has to be the unskilled workers' wage level in order to obtain gains from trade.
Indeed that the higher µ the higherp F * h the lower F -consumer's surplus from the consumption of the h-variant. Hence the loss in terms of wage mass has due to consumption shift has to be low enough to lead to gains from trade.
Combining the two last Lemmata we obtain 12 This result derives from the implicit assumption that the workforce no longer used after trade liberalization in the production of the low-quality variant remain unemployed. This assumption can be weakened admitting that a only a share of them remains unemployed outside the industry or that they find another job but at a wage lowe than r. The threshold values would change but the interpretation would remain the same. Using a model more similar to ours, Huzinga (1993) shows that with linear demands and monopoly union both union rents and firms profits in two symmetric countries increase with trade liberalization. This result is not confirmed by our analysis, indeed some agents (the low-quality firm in particular) always lose from trade liberalization, while the others' gains directly depend on the dimension of the trading partner.
Conclusion
Our work shows the importance of taking into account single markets specificities when undertaking positive and normative studies of industrial organization.
First of all in order to model more realistically (even with the caveat related to partial-equilibrium analysis) the asymmetries empirical literature describes the economic system. Secondly because, allowing for model asymmetries brings the possibility of distinguishing the different reasons that would lead different policy-makers to take the same decisions, such as -recalling results in the previous pages-contrasting trade liberalization.
Specifically, this paper studies the effects of trade liberalization between asymmetric, vertically differentiated industries where human capital is specific.
According to empirical evidence and theoretical analyses, we take into account two key features of vertical intra-industry trade. In particular we deal with factor (and labor in particular) endowment asymmetries as determinants of trade flows and non competitiveness of specific factors markets.
Using a multi-period model of vertical product differentiation we show that the parameters governing the effects of trade liberalization differ between countries, depending on their peculiar features.
The introduction into the picture of intra-industry trade liberalization of a union representing the skilled workers has a double effect. On one side it allows to rationalize the cost differential in the production of vertically differentiated goods when human capital is specific and the wage is set through the Nash bargaining solution. Secondly it unveils a link between the degree unionization degree of the market of the country endowed with skilled labor and the size of its trading partners: the higher the former the larger has to be the latter in order gains from trade to emerge.
The industry that has a "poor" endowment in terms of human capital, on the contrary, gains from trade if its wage level is low enough, or conversely, if the labor market in the trading partner is such that the production cost (and so the market price) of the imported good is low. Finally, there exist parametric regions for which both industries, even though for different reasons, lose from trade liberalization.
The present analysis could be extended, for example, allowing for multiple inputs and hence more sophisticated production functions for quality (Gab-szewicz and Turrini (2000)), or introducing further asymmetries on consumers' preferences and labor market structures, assuming, for example, unionization for unskilled workers as well.
